Ordered that the judgments are affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that the defendants are awarded one bill of costs.

During the early morning hours of June 14, 2008, a cargo van with 12 unrestrained passengers in the windowless cargo hold drifted into the median of Interstate 87 over the tapered, turned-down portion of a guardrail, and struck the concrete support pillar of a pedestrian bridge, killing the van driver, the front-seat passenger, and one passenger in the cargo hold. The remaining passengers in the cargo hold sustained various injuries. Some of the surviving passengers, and the administratrix of the estate of one of the decedents, commenced these claims against the defendants, the State of New York and the New York State Thruway Authority, seeking to hold the defendants liable for not installing a longer guardrail which they allege would have greatly reduced the severity of their injuries. Following a nonjury trial, the Court of Claims dismissed the claims based upon, among other things, the doctrine of qualified immunity. We affirm.

"A municipality owes the traveling public the absolute duty of keeping its highways in a reasonably safe condition" (Ames v City of New York, 177 A.D.2d 528, 531 [1991]; see Friedman v State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 271, 283 [1986]; Langer v Xenias, 134 A.D.3d 906 [2015]; Iacone v Passanisi, 133 A.D.3d 717, 718 [2015]). This duty, which extends to furnishing guardrails (see Lattanzi v State of New York, 53 N.Y.2d 1045 [1981]), "`is measured by the courts with consideration given to the proper limits on intrusion into the municipality's planning and decision-making functions'" (Kuhland v City of New York, 81 A.D.3d 786, 787 [2011], quoting Friedman v State of New York, 67 NY2d at 283). Thus, "a governmental body is accorded a qualified immunity from liability arising out of a highway safety planning decision" (Iacone v Passanisi, 133 AD3d at 718; see Kuhland v City of New York, 81 AD3d at 787). To establish its entitlement to qualified immunity, the governmental body must demonstrate "that the relevant discretionary determination by the governmental body was the result of a deliberative decision-making process" (Iacone v Passanisi, 133 AD3d at 718; see Affleck v Buckley, 96 N.Y.2d 553 [2001]; Friedman v State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 271 [1986]; Alexander v Eldred, 63 N.Y.2d 460 [1984]; Tomassi v Town of Union, 46 N.Y.2d 91 [1978]; Barone v County of Suffolk, 85 A.D.3d 836, 836 [2011]; Bresciani v County of Dutchess, N.Y., 62 A.D.3d 639 [2009]; Scott v City of New York, 16 A.D.3d 485 [2005]). "A municipality is entitled to qualified immunity where a governmental planning body `has entertained and passed on the very same question of risk as would ordinarily go to the jury'" (Turturro v City of New York, 77 A.D.3d 732, 735 [2010], quoting Weiss v Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 588 [1960]). Accordingly, where the decision made by the municipality or governmental body was not the product of a governmental plan or study, the doctrine of qualified immunity is inapplicable (see Klein v New York State Thruway Auth., 220 A.D.2d 486 [1995]; Cummins v County of Onondaga, 198 A.D.2d 875 [1993]).

Here, the Court of Claims correctly applied the doctrine of qualified immunity based on the evidence the defendants submitted at trial that the guardrail was designed pursuant to the design standards set forth by the New York State Department of Transportation, which were the result of a deliberate decision-making process of the type afforded immunity from judicial interference (see Kelley v State of New York, 133 A.D.3d 1337 [2015]; Selca v City of Peekskill, 78 A.D.3d 1160 [2010]; Galvin v State of New York, 245 A.D.2d 418 [1997]; cf. Madden v Town of Greene, 64 A.D.3d 1117 [2009]).

The claimants' remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.